José de la Mar

In this Spanish name, the first or paternal surname is La Serna and the second or maternal family name is Hinojosa.

The Most Excellent The Count of the Andes
40th Viceroy of Peru
In office January 29, 1821 – December 9, 1824
Monarch	Ferdinand VII
Preceded by	Joaquín de la Pezuela
Succeeded by	Juan Pío de Tristán
Personal details
Born	(1770-05-01)May 1, 1770 Jerez de la Frontera, Spain
Died	July 6, 1832(1832-07-06) (aged 62) Cádiz, Spain
Profession	Lieutenant General
Signature

José de la Serna e Hinojosa, 1st Count of the Andes (May 1, 1770 – July 6, 1832) was a Spanish general and colonial official. He was the last Spanish viceroy of Peru to exercise effective power (January 29, 1821 to December 1824).

Background

He was born in Jerez de la Frontera on 28 July 1770. His family had been dedicated to military careers for many generations. He was the 7th of the nine children of Álvaro de la Serna and Figueroa (Jerez de la Frontera, July 12, 1723 - March 6, 1791), Knight of the Order of Santiago, who dedicated himself to a military career and was a Caballero Veintiquatro (akin to councilor) of Jerez and Master of the Real Maestranza de Caballería de Ronda; and of Nicolasa Martínez de Hinojosa y López Trujillo (or Truxillo) (Jerez de la Frontera, September 1, 1739 - October 10, 1823). These names go back to the reconquest of Jerez.

On 29 December 1780 (at 10 years old), José de la Serna was appointed alcalde for the caballeros hidalgos. On 8 September 1781, he was accepted as a knight cadet by the Military College of Artillery of Segovia; his admission took place on September 20, 1782. In 1789 he graduated as second lieutenant or ensign.

He saw his first service (as a cadet) in the defense of Ceuta against the Moors in 1784, distinguishing himself in outings that destroyed the batteries of the besieger, forcing him to lift the siege. Later he saw service against the French in Catalonia and Roussillon until the signing of the Peace of Basel (1795). He was promoted to lieutenant.

The Treaty of San Ildefonso, allying Spain and France against England, brought him to fight alongside the French and under the orders of Admiral José de Mazarredo (1797), with the ship Bahamas from 1799 to 1802. In 1801 he received the rank of captain.

He was then transferred to Andalusia, entrusted with the inspection of Inválidos Hábiles, and gained the rank of sargento mayor or commandant in 1805.

He fought under Wellington during the campaign of the fourth coalition (1806-1807) in the Spanish War of Independence against the French.

The Peninsular War, 1807-1814

For broader coverage of this topic, see Peninsular War.

In 1808 La Serna joined as lieutenant colonel the improvised army organized by the local government of Valencia; he was involved in the defence of Valencia (June 1808) and in the battle of the Júcar river against Marshal Jeannot de Moncey.

His unit then went to assist besieged Zaragoza (15 June to 14 August 180), entering Paniza on 7 August 1808 with 6,000 men, 100 horses and 6 pieces of artillery, and reinforcing the threat on Lefebvre-Desnouettes's back which eventually forced the latter to abandon the siege. On 15 August, he officially received the rank of lieutenant colonel. He followed the actions of Castaños encased in his artillery and was present at the battle of Tudela (23 November 1808), a Spanish defeat that forced the army to retreat to Zaragoza.

During Zaragoza's second siege (20 December 1808-20 February 1809), the batteries located between Santa Engracia and the Convento de la Trinidad were under his command, and then those from the Puente de Piedra to the Puerta del Sol. In 1808, in the midst of the siege, he was appointed colonel and in 1809 promoted to brigadier. The siege of Zaragoza was the war action he was most proud of and, throughout his life, always wore the medal of his defenders as his favorite distinction. The capitulation of 20 February 1809 made him a captive; he was taken to the Nancy depot, from which he escaped in the autumn of 1812 with another officer. Both arrived together in Genoa, but lacking support and no ship to board, they crossed the Alps again and, crossing Bavaria in the middle of winter, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria and Macedonia, arrived in Thessaloniki after six months of walking and seven hundred and fifty leagues. Finally he was able to sail for Spain and arrived in Mahón on 28 March 1813.

In 1814 Ferdinand VII created the Order of Saint Hermelegind (Orden de San Hermenegildo) to recognize his supporters during his years of captivity and La Serna was awarded this distinction.

In command of Spanish forces in Upper Peru

For broader coverage of this topic, see Chilean War of Independence.

Reincorporated into service, he was appointed field marshal, and on 1 May 1816 he was named general in chief of the Army of Alto Peru to replace General Joaquín de la Pezuela who had been promoted to viceroy of Peru. He embarked in Cadiz on the frigate Venganza, with some officers and troops to strengthen the army he was going to command. He arrived in Arica on 7 September, and reached his destination as per his orders. This displeased viceroy Joaquín de la Pezuela, who had wanted to meet La Serna before the latter reached his assignment. Thus their relation started on the wrong foot, impairing La Serna's command of the Army of Upper Peru: his orders included that of reorganizing those troops and creating a General Staff, and Pezuela was against both measures. Moreover, the viceroy considered that La Serna should be subject to him because he himself represented the highest authority; and the general in chief was of the opinion that, as a general, he was independent in what pertained to his army — a view reinforced by that the territories subject to the Army of Upper Peru were not part of that viceroyalty but of Buenos Aires.

The viceroy imposed on La Serna to advance on Jujuy and Salta. La Serna expressly disagreed multiple times, not least because he did not have the necessary reserve body to guarantee communications. He and his troops reached Salta but had to withdraw in a painful retreat back to their starting bases. In 1817, La Serna reorganized his army and expanded it from a defensive force to develop its attack capability. This measure cost money, taken from taxes, and that became another point of contention with the viceroy. The confrontation developed to the point that he formally presented his resignation to the King.

At that time, and in view of the successive announcements of a major expedition to Buenos Aires from the Peninsula, Captain General José de San Martín decided to invade Chile with his Army of the Andes, by crossing the Andes via the most direct route. The 21-day crossing of the mountains from Argentina was arduous, but the Battle of Chacabuco was a resounding success for San Martín who defeated the troops sent to stop him — greatly helped in that by the contradictory orders and doubts of Royal Governor Field Marshal Marcó. Very few of the royal troops were able to finally embark in Valparaíso.

Pezuela decided to recover Chile and ordered La Serna to form a reserve force to support the action he planned. This lead to yet another disagreement between him and La Serna, with the latter again presenting his resignation from his post in the army of Upper Peru. In December 1817 the expedition for the reconquest of Chile left under the command of General Osorio (Pezuela's son-in-law), and arrived at Talcahuano in February 1818. On March 19, the Royalist army attacked O'Higgins at Cancharayada and achieved victory in that battle, seizing all the enemy artillery. But Osorio missed taking advantage of it; and when he reached the plains of Maipú on April 5, his troops were subjected to a heavy defeat by San Martín's troops. Meanwhile, the formation of the reserve corps continued to widen the gap between La Serna and Pezuela, although it was eventually organized according to the viceroy’s wishes. Throughout 1818, the Army of Upper Peru carried out important actions against insurgent parties; willing or not, the territory under its command was "pacified". But furthering the clash of personalities, La Serna thought that war should be offensive and Pezuela thought it should be defensive. Also, Pezuela was considered an absolutist and La Serna, having fought in the name of the Cádiz Constitution, was seen as a liberal. But Víctor Peralta contests these views, citing among other examples that La Serna supposedly reinstituted the freedom of the press but no one had the right to publish anything in favour of Pezuela; another exemple is that La Serna tried to limit as much as possible the election of municipal councils, whereas Pezuela had publicly called for these elections.

La Serna formally resigned again on 23 November 1818, citing ill health. Pezuela remained lenient regarding this unauthorized move, which he did not punish; and La Serna returned to wait for his official leave. While waiting for this resignation's formal acceptance, in the spring of 1819 La Serna repeated with complete success the previous unfortunate expedition to Jujuy, giving a severe punishment to the gauchos who harassed his army and taking thousands of cattle.

He obtained his official leave on 31 September and left for Lima, where he arrived on 29 November. But Pezuela was suspicious of the chiefs he had under his orders; and he was also preoccupied by the evolution of the situation in Santa Fé (now called Bogotá). So he asked La Serna not to embark for Spain but to remain in Lima as his second-in-command, thus becoming lieutenant general.

During 1819, Lima – from the point of view of the Spanish – balanced between the hopes of the announced Spanish expedition against Buenos Aires and the dread of a Chilean invasion of its coasts. The Riego coup d'état on 1 January 1820, however, not only changed the political regime in Spain, but also meant the abandonment of the great expedition of 18,000 men which could have restored the King's authority in South America. This freed San Martín from the worry of an expeditionary army, and in September 1819 he landed at Pisco with 4,300 men, only 300 km from Lima.

This came only four months after the Spanish government ordered Pezuela, on 11 April 1819, to enter into negotiations with the patriots. The Royal Order asked the insurgents to swear by the newly implemented Cádiz Constitution of 1812; if they did not accept that, commissioners were to be sent to Madrid and in the meantime hostilities should be suspended. La Serna thought that the insurgents would not be willing to swear allegiance to the constitution; so he proposed that cash be offered, as well as the control of Tacna and Arica. His real aim was to have the commissioners travel to and from Spain and to lenghten negociations so as to gain enough time to strengthen the army.

Meanwhile, Lima was in chaos. The city had endured a year-long blockade but became isolated by sea after November 1820 when Cochrane attacked and took the frigate Esmeralda; and it was also surrounded by land with guerrilla forces that had come from the Andes. Pezuela insisted that Lima should be preserved at all costs, and that its loss would sign the defeat of the whole loyalist cause. La Serna, again, clashed with Pezuela and saw Lima as expendable – for practical reasons: it was undefendable without a functioning navy, and it was very difficult to provision. In his experience, difficult positions should be left to the enemy.

The coup against Pezuela

Further information: [[:Pronunciamiento de Aznapuquio]]

In January 1821, a month after the Northern provinces declared their independence, the situation in Lima reached its boiling point. On January 29, 1821, a group of officers petitioned viceroy Pezuela to resign and nominate La Serna to take over his post. Jerónimo Valdés and José de Canterac were key figures in getting these officers to rally for the coup. All the members of the military Ejército Real signed a declaration accusing the viceroy of inaction, of having made many tactical mistakes and of failing to defend the city against San Martín. This letter quickly reached the Spanish Court and on 29 July and 13 August 1821 the new viceroy was confirmed in all political and military positions.

Originally, La Serna refused the command and requested his passport for Spain. Pezuela replied that if he himself made the sacrifice of leaving, La Serna had to make equivalent sacrifice and accept it. Eventually, Pezuela relinquished his authority as viceroy to La Serna, who took office the next morning 30 January.

Implications

This event had far-reaching and socially-noteworthy consequences. Viceroys being deposed were no novelty: it had already happened in Mexico, Río de la Plata and New Granada – but only in the context of forming juntas. This mutiny, known in Spanish as the or “pronunciamiento de Aznapuquio”, was not so much rooted into previous American experiences, but came most of all from the Riego coup d'état in Spain. Its main trait is that it marks the time when the military as a corporation began intervening in politics.

As viceroy of Peru

La Serna was sworn in as interim viceroy. He gave up 60 per cent of his salary to alleviate the economic situation of the viceroyalty; following this, all the army chiefs and ministers of the Audiencia agreed to retain half their assets and to reintegrate them when conditions were favourable.

The change of politics in Spain also meant that the awaited reinforcement of 20,000 men promised to the royalists in South America never arrived. Instead, the Spanish Parliament sent another delegate bearing its orders to the new viceroy: the captain of frigate Manuel Abreu. But before meeting the viceroy in April 1821, Abreu met with San Martín — a move that greatly displeased the loyalists in Lima.

The instructions that captain Manuel Abreu brought were quite similar to those given to Pezuela: essentially that hostilities should be suspended; and that the Constitution should be sworn in and deputies from the independantists sent to the Spanish Parliament.

Negotiations did begin on May 3, 1821: deputies from both parties met in Punchauca, thirty kilometers from Lima. During these talks they agreed to an armistice and a meeting between San Martín and the viceroy. San Martín and La Serna met in person on June 2. The negotiations lasted until June 24. Those backing the “nación española” were not, however, able to accept the only condition that the other side really wanted: official recognition of independence. The insurgents demanded it, and Spain insisted on submission to the king. In a private letter San Martín acknowledged he had never really thought of accepting peace and had just wanted to gain time. On June 25, hostilities began again.

La Serna took a strategic measure, which he had already proposed six months before: he evacuated Lima, without resources because of the blockade of the Chilean fleet, and withdrew inland. The operation was carried out in two corps of army commanded respectively by Canterac and La Serna, leaving a strong garrison at Callao. Established in the valley of Jauja, La Serna reorganized and rebuilt the army, providing it with the necessary equipment thanks to he rich and populated valleys of the interior. San Martín entered the capital four days after La Serna left it, and was received with jubilation by the common people. On July 15, 1821 the Act of Independence of Peru was signed at the city hall in Lima.

When La Serna was in position to assist Callao, he sent Canterac on August 24 with 4,000 men – less than that of San Martín, who however did not dare to interpose himself. When this expedition returned to the mountains, La Mar surrendered the fortresseson September 19, 1821, due to lack of supplies. La Serna established the capital in Cuzco; he brought with him the first printing press in Cuzco, on which was published the famous newspaper El Depositario. He strengthened its position so that it changed the course of the war, despite not receiving any help from Spain. Canterac defeated a powerful insurgent army commanded by Domingo Tristán at Ica on 20 April 1822. This victory provided the viceroy with the necessary rifles, which was the only thing he could not build in his domains.

In Cuzco, dissension broke out in the Royalist army. From Februaey 1824 onward, General Olañeta stopped recognizing La Serna as the legitimate representative of the King; he refused to obey and maintained an independent Royalist force in Upper Peru.

Canterac was defeated on August 6, 1824 by Simón Bolívar at Junín. La Serna was now resolved to risk everything to crush the revolt. He left Cuzco in October with a well-disciplined army of 10,000 infantry and 1,600 cavalry. He met the insurgent army in the mountain plain of Ayacucho on December 8; the battle of Ayacucho happened the following day, and La Serna's troops were totally defeated by General Antonio José de Sucre. La Serna was wounded and taken prisoner. The Royalist army had 2,000 dead and wounded and lost 3,000 prisoners, with the remainder of the army entirely dispersed. General Canterac, the second in command, signed an honorable capitulation the next day, December 9, 1824. La Serna, who on the date of the battle had been created Condado de los Andes by King Ferdinand VII, was released soon afterward and sailed for Europe. In all but name, the Spanish Viceroyalty of Peru was at an end.

Return to Spain

Back in Spain, La Serna was welcomed at court and his administration was approved. He remained for a few years in Jerez de la Frontera. On January 27, 1831 he was appointed captain general of Granada and president of the Royal Chancellery of Granada. In his new command he had to face the invasion of Manzanares, who had landed in Malaga as well as Torrijos. Then he undertook an active fight against the banditry that was ravaging Andalusia, and managed to bring the departure of Los Botijas to justice.

He died childless in the military hospital of Cádiz on 6 July 1832. His will showed that the public administration owed him 174,000 pesos,as his wages were never paid in Peru.

Sources

• Arteaga, Íñigo Moreno y de (2010). "José de la Serna y Martínez de Hinojosa". hispanica.rah.es (in Spanish). Real Academia de la Historia. Retrieved Jan 31, 2025.
• Sobrevilla Perea, Natalia (2011). "From Europe to the Andes and back: Becoming 'Los Ayacuchos'" (PDF). European History Quarterly. 41 (3): 472-488 (see p. 475). Retrieved Jan 1, 2025.

External links

• (in Spanish) Short biography (Archived 2009-10-31) at Encarta
• The Battle of Ayacucho, order of battle